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Kilpatrick: Kilpatrick: Maintenance in Gross

Maintenance in Gross: A Lack of Statutory
Authorization Is Finally Recognized
Cates v. Cates'
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Missouri Legislature passed the Divorce Reform Act in 1973
it was the first change in Missouri divorce law in ninety-five years.' The
resulting law was a response to a changing population and its social attitudes.
The legislature created a no-faulf dissolution of marriage law that changed
the basic underlying ideology of alimony, an award which was granted as
damages for the husband's breach of the marriage contract, to one of
maintenance, award requires the requesting party to show need for support. 4
This basic difference between pre-Reform Act alimony and post-Reform Act
maintenance lies at the heart of the problem in Cates. Whether intentional or
not, the Missouri Legislature failed to repeal a portion of the pre-Reform Act
law that allowed for the allocation of "alimony in gross," an award of alimony
in a lump sum payment in a decree in favor of the wife.5
Since the 1973 Reform Act, courts have continued the practice of
decreeing maintenance in gross, a lump sum payment of maintenance.'
Courts' opinions (both pre- and post-Reform Act) frequently allowed payment
of these "in gross" awards to be made in installments.' This practice created

1. 819 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
2. Charlotte P. Thayor, Symposium on Dissolutionof Marriage: Introduction,29 J. Mo.
B. 496, 496 (1973).
3. This term of art is misleading because the "conduct ofa party seeking maintenance during
the marriage" is a factor in determining the amount and length of a maintenance order. Mo.
RFv. STAT. § 452.335.2(7) (1986); see also Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330 (including conduct of
parties as a factor in determining division of marital property). The relevant "no-fault" aspect
is the basic ground for dissolution of marriage. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.305 (1986).
4. Robert G. Ruhland, Symposium on DissolutionofMarriage: Maintenanceand Support,
29 J.Mo. B. 516, 516 (1973).
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.080 (1986). The pertinent part of the statute reads:
Upon a decree of divorce in favor of the wife, the court may, in its discretion, decree
alimony in gross or from year to year. When alimony is decreed in gross, such
decree shall be a general lien on the realty of the party against whom the decree may
be rendered, as in the case of other judgements.
Id.
6. See generallyLeitz v. Moore, 703 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. Ct.App. 1985); Brown v. Brown, 673
S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct.App. 1984); Mottel v. Mottel, 664 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct App. 1984); Gunkel
v. Gunkel, 633 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. Ct App. 1982); D.E.W. v. M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977).
7. See, e.g., Mottel v. Mottel, 664 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. Ct.App. 1984); Phelps v. Phelps,
620 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Mo. Ct.App. 1981); Warren v. Warren, 601 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); In re Marriage of Amett, 598 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Carr v. Carr,
556 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Mo. Ct.App. 1977); Laney v. Laney, 535 S.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Mo. CL
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a problem of uncertainty in interpreting when, or even if, these awards
terminate upon remarriage of the recipient spouse. 8 Courts have taken two
different paths9 and Cates is the Missouri Supreme Court's resolution of this
issue.'0
This Note will analyze the result reached in the instant decision as well
as the practical implications the decision will have on numerous in gross
awards being paid today. After outlining the statutory framework under which
the court operated, this Note will briefly discuss the history of the application
of in gross alimony awards and the divergent path that Missouri courts have
taken, either terminating or sustaining the award upon the recipient spouse's
remarriage. This Note will then discuss the implications of the Cates decision
on past maintenance awards and make suggestions for structuring future
ones.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Greene County Circuit Court dissolved the marriage of Rochelle and
Larry Cates on May 24, 1988." In addition, the trial court's decree
approved and incorporated the property settlement and separation agreement
of the parties, finding it was "fair and not unconscionable."' 2 The court
found it necessary to make an award of "maintenance in gross" to Ms. Cates
in the amount of $7,800, payable at the rate of $325 per month as set out in4
the separation agreement.'" The court incorporated this into the decree.

App. 1976).
8. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.370.3 (1991 Supp.).
9. See Mika v. Mika, 728 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (lump sum or in gross
award payable in installments survives death or remarriage). ContraNelson v. Nelson, 720
S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (unaccrued installments of in gross awards payable by
installment are terminated when recipient's dependency ended by death or remarriage), overruled
by Cates v. Cates, 819 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
10. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 738.

11. Id. at 732.
12. Id. at 732-33.
13. Id.
14. Id. The separation agreement as quoted in the text of the case stated in part:
5. Maintenance. Husband acknowledges certain obligations to Wife that have arisen
from the marital relationship, and the parties, after giving due consideration to all

relevant factors for the award of maintenance, including those set forth in RSMo.
453.335, the difference in earning power between them, the need for maintenance
and the benefits that would have accrued to Wife from the continuation of the
marriage, agree that the Wife is entitled to maintenance. Accordingly, Husband shall
pay to wife, as maintenance in gross, the sum of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred
($7,800.00) Dollars, payable at the rate of Three Hundred Twenty Five ($325.00)
Dollars per month ....
The parties acknowledge that the above described maintenance provisions are
intended to constitute "alimony" within the meaning of Section 71(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 ...thus constituting gross income to Wife and a deductible
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/13
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Ms. Cates remarried on June 1, 1989, after which Mr. Cates stopped making
his requisite monthly payments. 5 Ms. Cates attempted to garnish Mr. Cates'
wages and he responded by filing a motion to quash garnishment. 6 The trial
court sustained Mr. Cates' motion. 7 Ms. Cates filed an appeal, alleging that
her remarriage did not terminate an obligation to pay the remaining lump sum
maintenance installments.'
The Missouri Supreme Court held that an award of maintenance "in
gross" will no longer be recognized as a tool for providing maintenance
awards under Missouri Revised Statute section 452.335, directly overruling
Missouri case law in conflict with this decision. 9 The court also held that
in the future, when the decree specifies that the in gross award is to effectuate
a distribution of property, the payments will not be terminated by death or
remarriage."
When the instrument granting an in gross award (1) is
ambiguous or (2) clearly states it is based on the economic needof the spouse,
but is in lieu of an actual award of maintenance as defined by statute, courts
"will determine the continued obligation of the paying party to pay maintenance following remarriage or death upon the language (or silence) of the
separation agreement or the court's decree."'" The court remanded the case
to determine whether or not the parties intended payments to continue upon

the remarriage of Ms. Cates, because "the ambiguity of the parties' intent is
created
by2 reliance on this Court's prior (but now overruled in part)
decisions."'

expense to Husband ....
This support obligation is not related to the division of property and is not
intended in any way to constitute a form of payment for any rights or interests of
the Wife.
The maintenance hereinbefore provided shall be deemed contractual in nature,
not subject to modification by the Court and subject to modification by the parties
in writing.
Id. at 733.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 732.
19. Id. at 738.
20. Id.
21. Id. The language the court was referring to was language indicating an agreement by
the parties to extend the obligation beyond death or remarriage.
22. Id.
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III. LEGAL HISTORY

A. Statutory Framework
The Divorce Reform Act was written with very specific provisions for the
award of maintenance, its subsequent modification, and specific events that
terminate the payor spouse's obligation to continue payments. In keeping with
the gender-neutral nature of the Reform Act, either spouse can receive an
award of maintenance.' The spouse seeking such an award must show he
or she:
(1) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to
him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate24
that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
The requirement to show either need or young children requiring an "at-home"
custodian must be met before a spouse will be given a maintenance award.
The same section defines how the court may structure the award by providing
for modification and eventual termination. 5 A court is allowed to award
maintenance for an indefinite or specific period of time.26 The statute
requires that the parties designate whether the award is modifiable or not
modifiable. If the award is modifiable, the party requesting modification
28
must show a "substantial and continuing change of circumstances."
The Reform Act is very specific in stating what will terminate an award
of maintenance. Section 452.370 (the "Maintenance Termination Statute")29
states that "[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the
decree, the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance is terminated upon

23. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.335.1 (1986).
24. Id.
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.335.3 (Supp. 1990). The statute reads:

3. The maintenance order shall state if it is modifiable or nonmodifiable. The court
may order maintenance which includes a termination date. Unless the maintenance
order which includes a termination date is nonmodifiable, the court may order the
maintenance decreased, increased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified based
upon a substantial and continuing change of circumstances which occurred prior to
the termination date of the original order.
Id.
26. Id. An award of maintenance for a definite period is logically made with the knowledge
that the recipient spouse will be self-sufficient after a certain time or event, or that she will not
be required to stay home and care for small children after a certain time.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Because the discussion in this Note frequently refers to three different statutes, the
author has chosen to title them as they are used in the context of the Note to avoid confusion.
These titles in no way reflect the entire purpose of each statute, but are merely for convenience
of reference.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/13
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the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance." 30 The Maintenance Termination Statute is the provision the Cates
court applied to terminate an award of maintenance in gross payable in
installments.3 1
B. JudicialInterpretation
1. Pre-Reform Act
The origin of "in gross" alimony dates back to some of the earliest
codification of divorce law in Missouri and is reflected in section 452.080 (the
The underlying rationale of alimony
"Alimony Authorization Statute").

awards at that time was to grant the innocent wife a sum of money, in gross
or in installments, that would fairly compensate her for the loss of support by
the husband's breach and subsequent termination of the marriage contract.33
Courts preferred a lump sum payment up front when possible, for the "welfare
and happiness" of the couple. 4 They reasoned that this would allow a
complete and clean break, because the estranged wife would not be dependent
upon her husband for sustenance after the marriage was ended.35 In Wright
v. Wright,35 however, the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated that if an award
was to be given in gross, it should be an amount large enough to allow the
wife to live off its income in a fashion comparable to what the husband could
have, provided in an award of alimony from year to year. 37 If an in gross
award would fail to achieve an equal level of income, then the court should
award an allowance from year to year, payable on certain dates. 3' This
authorized Missouri courts to make either a lump sum award of alimony or
an indefinite award with periodic payments.

30. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.370.3 (1991 Supp.).
31. Cates,819 S.W.2d at 738. The court refers to § 452.370.2 (instead of § 452.370.3) in
its decision because it was referring to the pre-1990 statute. The pertinent provision is the same
except for the renumbering.
32. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.080 (1986 & 1991 Supp.). The historical note dates the
original enactment of this section to 1868. Id.
33. Ruhland, supra note 4, at 516; see also Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 734; Nelson v. Nelson,
221 S.W. 1066, 1067 (Mo. 1920) (Nelson 1).
34. Wright v. Wright, 179 S.W. 950, 951 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915); see also Lemp v. Lemp,
155 S.W. 1057, 1061 (Mo. 1914). The court eloquently stated:
It is just and humane, and lies at the very foundation of the policy of absolute
divorce, that the innocent and injured woman be delivered from the body of her dead
injury, and not be required for life to live in its atmosphere and taste its flavor with
her daily bread.

Id.
35. See supra note 33.

36. 179 S.W. 950 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915).
37. Id. at 952.
38. Id.
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The next question that arose in the application of the Alimony Authorization Statute was whether the former wife's remarriage terminated an indefinite
award of alimony with periodic payments. The Missouri Supreme Court
decided this issue for the first time in Nelson v. Nelson (Nelson 1)." The
court held that if the wife remarried and obtained support insuring the lifestyle
to which she was accustomed from her second husband, then it was illogical
and "unseemly" for her to get the double benefit of payments from her exhusband and support from her current husband. 0 The court held, however,
that remarriage did not ipso facto end the obligation to pay alimony and that
only court action could terminate the award." The legislature codified part
of this judicial rule in section 452.075 of the Missouri Revised Statutes in
1957.42 However, the legislature reversed the Nelson I holding that court
action was required to terminate the husband's obligations and instead
provided that the remarriage does ipso facto relieve the obligation as of the
date of the wife's remarriage.43 The legislature did not extend the automatic
termination to lump sum, in gross awards or accrued past due periodic
payments because these were considered the wife's vested property right as of
the date of the in gross award or as of the time the payments accrued. 4
After the Nelson I decision, problems began to arise when courts started
allowing the lump sum, in gross alimony award to be paid out in installments
over a definite period of time. Specifically, the question arose whether a
husband's obligation to make such installment payments terminated under the
judicial rule codified in section 452.075. The first cases authorizing
installment payments appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These cases
held that even though an award of alimony in gross was allowed to be paid
in installments, it would retain the status of an award in gross insofar as it
would not be subject to subsequent modification or termination.45 In

39. 221 S.W. 1066 (Mo. 1920).

40. Id. at 1067.
41. Id. at 1068.
42. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.075 (1986) (enacted in 1957).
43. Id. The statute reads:
When a divorce has been granted, and the court has made an order or decree
providing for the payment of alimony and maintenance of the wife, the remarriage
of the former wife shall relieve the former husband from further payment of alimony
to the former wife from the date of the remarriage, without the necessity offurther
court action, but the remarriage shall not relieve the former husband from the
provisions of any judgment or decree or order providing for the support of any
minor children.
Id. (emphasis added). This section, which predates the Divorce Reform Act, has also stayed
intact along with Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.080 (1986).
44. See Leutzinger v. McNeely, 273 S.W. 241, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) ("We are of the
opinion that the decree awarding the alimony in gross to the wife becomes a vested property
right.. .");
see also Nelson 1, 221 S.W. at 1069.
45. Laney v. Laney, 535 S.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Mo. CL App. 1977) (citing Backy v. Backy,
355 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Carl v. Carl, 284 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955)).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/13
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Swanson v. Swanson,4 6 the Missouri Supreme Court stated that the Alimony
Authorization Statute provides special status to the in gross award even if
payable in installments because it becomes an automatic lien on the husband's
realty.4 7 The court applied this provision, holding that an in gross award of
any kind survives the wife's death or remarriage, and that an in gross award
is not subject to modification.4"
2. Post-Reform Act
The legislature's failure to repeal or qualify the Alimony Authorization

Statute when it enacted the Divorce Reform Act in 197349 was the beginning
of a confusing era for in gross awards. Robert Ruhland, in an article
examining the new Act, stated that "[i]t does not appear to me.. . that 'in
gross' orders for maintenance are contemplated under the Act."5'
He
believed that the new Act's no-fault element, the requirement for a showing
of need for an award of maintenance, and the difference in the underlying
philosophies of alimony (a breach of marital contract remedy) and maintenance (an award based on reasonable needs) precluded the use of in gross
awards in aiding a dependent spouse.5 However, courts have disagreed with
this conclusion for almost twenty years.
In D.E.W. v. MW.,52 the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District,
specifically held that the new Dissolution of Marriage Act did not preclude the
court from awarding an in gross amount of maintenance,s3 noting that the
legislature had failed to repeal the Alimony Authorization Statute, which
allows for such.54 The court also stated that the new provisions authorizing
maintenance did not preclude an in gross award.55 It pointed to the specific
language of the new statute that stated: "'The maintenance order shall be...
for suchperiods of time as the court deems just.
,,,."6 By interpreting the
Maintenance Authorization Statute and the Alimony Authorization Statute
together, the court held that the specific intent of the Missouri Legislature to
retain in gross awards remained in the divorce statute.57 The court reasoned

46. 464 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1971).
47. Id. at 228.

48. Id
49. Mo. Rlv. STAT. §§ 452.300-.415 (1986).
50. Ruhland, supra note 4, at 517.
51. Id.
52. 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
53. Id. at 282; see also Hawkins v. Hawkins, 511 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. 1974); Grotjan v.
Grotjan, 519 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. CL App. 1975); Staab v. Staab, 515 SAV.2d 787 (Mo. Ct. App.

1974).
54. D.E.W., 552 S.W.2d at 282-83.
55. Id. at 283.
56. Id. (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.335 (Supp. 1973) (court's emphasis)).
57. Id. Note that Catesfound this reasoning flawed because an award ofmaintenance based
on need cannot be inferred from a statute that awards alimony as damages for breach of the
marriage contracL Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 734-35.
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that in gross awards were consistent with the intent of the new law to
encourage self-sufficiency in the recipient spouse because the awards allowed
the needy spouse to get a new start, while at the same time severing
dependency. 8 The court placed one limitation on granting in gross awards
payable in installments, namely that such awards should only be granted if it
was unlikely that the parties' conditions would go unchanged for the duration
of the award.59 This limitation was based on the rationale in prior decisions
that in gross awards were not modifiable. Although unstated, the underlying
assumption was that because in gross awards were not modifiable, they should
not be extended beyond actual need as required by section 452.335 (the
"Maintenance Authorization Statute").60
Until recent years, Missouri courts consistently had held that the revised
statutes authorized maintenance in gross, that it was not modifiable, and that
an award as such survived either spouse's death or the recipient spouse's
remarriage. 6' The Missouri Supreme Court, prior to Cates, addressed all but
the termination issue in Doerflinger v. Doerflinger.62 Doerflinger involved
a wife who was seeking modification of a fixed-term maintenance award (an
amount payable for a fixed period of time without a lump sum amount being
specified) based on a change of circumstances.63 The court held that the
Maintenance Authorization Statute does allow for an award in gross as part of
the full range of support payments to the needy spouse, thereby refusing to
rely on the rationale of D.E.W. v.M.W., which used the Alimony Authorization Statute as partial authority for this award.' It stated that because of the
new no-fault divorce laws, the Alimony Authorization Statute could rarely be
applied, since the section is limited to an award based on fault to an "injured
and innocent' wife.65
The Doerflingercourt held that a fixed-term award and an award in gross

payable in installments were one and the same because both were essentially
a determination of a certain sum necessary for the recipient spouse to achieve
independence.' The court also held that neither of these types of awards

58. Id. The court referred to the rationale in Letup v. Lemp, 155 S.W. 1057, 1061 (Mo.
1914). See supranotes 33-38 and accompanying text. It is necessary to note that this decision
was made long before the Divorce Reform Act and really related more to the underlying reason
for awarding alimony as a remedy for breach of the marriage contract and not the Reform Act's
requirement of a showing of need.
59. D.E.W., 552 S.W.2d at 283.
60. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 452.335 (1986 & 1991 Supp.); see also supra note 24 and

accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Gunkel v. Gunkel, 633 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Jacobs v. Jacobs,
628 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. CL App. 1982); In re Marriage of Amett, 598 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980); Carr v. Carr, 556 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. CL App. 1977).
62. 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983).
63. Id. at 799.
64. Id. at 800 n.3. (The court stated that § 452.080 "inexplicably was not repealed" when
the Divorce Reform Act was enacted.).
65. Id. at 800.
66. Id. at 800-01.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/13
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were subject to modification upon a change in circumstances because they
werefinal adjudicationsof the financial need of the recipient spouse. 7 Final
adjudications can only be reviewed by appeal of the original judgment."8
The language in the Maintenance Termination Statute which limits modification "'only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion,"' meant that
application to in gross awards was foreclosed, because no future payments
accrued upon which this section could operate.69 The unstated assumption
of the Doerflinger court was that the installments were already due and owing
once the decree had been entered. Therefore, the right to payment immediately became vested in the recipient spouse. The court's only stated rationale for
this conclusion, however, was limited to reliance on language in prior cases

seeming 70to allow modification only if the award was for an unlimited

duration.
After Doerflinger,Missouri courts continued to hold that in gross and
71
fixed-term maintenance were not terminated upon death or remarriage.
72
These courts' rationale is reflected in the holding of Mottel v. Mottel. In
that case, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, first declared that
Doerflinger had held lump sum and fixed-term awards were the same in
character as in gross awards and thus were not modifiable.73 The court then
stated that D.E.W. v. MW. recluded termination based on death or remarriage
for these types of awards. ' The Mottel court and many other courts have
uniformly failed to recognize that Doerflinger based its authorization for an
award of maintenance in gross upon the Maintenance Authorization Statute,
refusing to apply the Alimony Authorization Statute in the no-fault divorce
framework of the Reform Act." The court in D.E.W. v. M.W., on the other
hand, based its authorization for in gross awards, and thus its rationale for
nontermination, on the Alimony Authorization Statute.76 While this was a

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id at 800.
70. Id. at 801. The court determined that the statement in Poaguev. Poagueassumed that
a maintenance award of limited duration was not modifiable. The statement was: "'It
[maintenance] should then be of unlimited duration, the amount of which might be subject to
modification if appellant's financial condition should in fact improve."' Id.(quoting Poague v.
Poague, 479 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. CL App. 1979)). The court also referred to the holding in
Royal v. Royal for support: "an award of maintenance for an indefinite term was required to

at 802
preserve entitlement of the wife to relief by modification under Section 452.370." Id.
(citing Royal v. Royal, 617 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)).
71. See, e.g., Mika v. Mika, 728 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Lietz v. Moore,

703 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Mottel v. Mottel, 664 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
72. 664 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).

73. Id. at 27.
74. Id.
75. Doerflinger,646 S.W.2d at 800.

76. D.E.W., 552 S.W.2d at 282-83.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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In Nelson v. Nelson77 (Nelson II), the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District came to a different conclusion.78 The court refused to hold
that the trial court had erred in including an express clause in the decree of
dissolution terminating the installment payments of an in gross award if either
The court restricted the
party died or the recipient spouse remarried.
Doerflinger holding to the prohibition of modification of in gross or fixedterm awards.8" The court then held that the Maintenance Termination Statute
did apply to in gross awards authorized under the Maintenance Authorization
Statute. Thus, such awards terminated upon death or remarriage absent
written agreement or an express decree to the contrary.8'
The Nelson II court stated that because Doerflinger decided that
maintenance in gross was authorized by the Maintenance Authorization Statute
and not the Alimony Authorization Statute, it was "imbued with the purposes
of section 452.335 [the Maintenance Authorization Statute]."82 The Nelson
1I court ruled that maintenance is awarded only when a spouse shows a need
for reasonable support not fulfilled by an apportionment of marital property,
and then only for a period of time until the dependent spouse reaches
reasonable self-sufficiency.83 "That the maintenance continues to a spouse
only until the need and dependency for support remain is [the] theme" of the
statute and decisions that follow it." The decision to award maintenance in
gross is a final adjudication of the spouse's need and dependency, and
therefore is the reason for barring modification of the award as to amount or
duration.8" But Nelson II noted that the trial court's decision that a gross
award is payable in installments is a decision that the full sum is not
immediately necessary, leaving the unaccrued installments subject to
termination.86 However, should the trial court's estimation of need and
dependency be reduced by death or remarriage, the court reasoned that

77. 720 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
78. Id. at 955.
79. Id at 948. The terms of the trial court's decree were:
TIS FURTHERORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED thatPetitioner [husband]
shall pay Respondent [wife] as maintenance-in-gross the sum of $49,500.00, payable
in installments of $1,500.00 per month, with the first such payment to be due on the
1st day of June, 1985 and on the same date each month thereafter until fully paid,
same to terminate earlierin the event of the death of eitherparty or remarriageof
Respondent [husband(sic)].
Id. (court's emphasis).
80. Id. at 954.
81. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 30.
82. Nelson II, 720 S.W.2d at 954.
83. Id. at 952. See supra text accompanying note 24 for the text of § 452.335.
84. 720 S.W.2d at 952 (citing Sansone v. Sansone, 615 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Ralnes v. Raines, 583
S.W.2d 564, 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).
85. Id. at 953-54 (quoting Doerflinger,646 S.W.2d at 801).
86. Id at 954.
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continuance of the obligation would be a direct conflict of the stated purpose
of the statutes."
In trying to reconcile Doerflingerwith its holding, the Nelson II court left
a large gap in logic: non-specific changed circumstances that end dependency
would not be allowed to modify the decree, yet other specific events such as
marriage or death ending the dependency could terminate it. Cates resolves
this problem as well as the conflict between Doerflingerand D.E. W.
The basic misunderstanding of the difference between alimony and
maintenance underlies the confusion created by the legislature's failure to
repeal the Alimony Authorization Statute. In order to resolve the conflicts
between the courts of appeals, the Cates court had to decide whether the
Maintenance Termination Statute applied to in gross maintenance awards
payable in installments when the recipient spouse remarried or when either of
the parties died. In reaching a decision, the court also had to determine
whether in gross awards were authorized under the Reform Act's Maintenance
Authorization Statute. The web of confusing logic created by the desire of the
lower courts to uphold this award beyond the statutory termination events had
to be untangled.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer of the Cates decision to
resolve the conflict in Missouri courts on the question of whether the
remarriage of the recipient spouse terminates the remaining obligation to pay
installments of a lump sum award. 8 The court began by acknowledging the
presumption created by the Maintenance Termination Statute that future
statutory maintenance obligations terminate upon the death of either party or
the remarriage of the recipient spouse, rebuttable only by an agreement in
writing or an express clause in the decree of dissolution that the obligation
extends beyond the statutory cut-off.8 9 The court outlined three levels of
inquiry to determine the issues of the instant case:
1.
2.
3.

Whether the maintenance award under scrutiny is "statutory maintenance" as defined under the Maintenance Authorization Statute.
If so, whether payments yet to be made on the in gross award are
"future payments" so as to be subject to the Maintenance Termination
Statute.
If both of these questions are answered affirmatively, then the final
inquiry is whether the decree of dissolution, the separation agreement,
or a separate written agreement expressly provide for continuation of
payments beyond remarriage. 90

87. Id.
88. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 732.
89. Id. at 734. The court noted that the legislature had amended § 452.370 in 1987 and

1990, but the provision referred to remains substantially the same in its application to this case.

Id. at 734 n.l.
90. Id.at 734.
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In analyzing the first level of inquiry, the court began by distinguishing
the policies underlying pre-Reform Act alimony and post-Reform Act
maintenance.9 "Alimony served 'as the equivalent of that obligation for
support which arises in favor of the wife out of the marriage contract,"' and
thus was deemed an assessment of damages for breach of contract by the
husband.' In contrast, maintenance "proceeds from 'the need for reasonable
support by one spouse after the disruption of the marriage," and because of
these statutory requirements, "'maintenance issues for support and only for
support-and then, until the dependent spouse achieves a reasonable selfsufficiency." 93
The court stated that their previous decision in Doerflingermisstated the
law by recognizing maintenance in gross under the Maintenance Authorization
Statute absent express statutory authorization.94 The Cates court speculated
that the Alimony Authorization Statute providing for "alimony in gross" was
not repealed when the 1973 amendments were enacted in order to permit
enforcement of judgments entered under that section prior to the effective date

of the 1973 Reform Act.95 The phrase "maintenance in gross" does not
appear anywhere in the Reform Act provisions and the court stated that it was
illogical, without express statutory authority, to allow lump sum maintenance
awards based on need that were not subject to modification in light of the
underlying policy of maintenance. 6 Maintenance is based on need "only so
long as the need exists."'97 The assumption is that a nonmodifiable lump sum
award would never be able to take into account changes in circumstances that
end the "need" of the dependent spouse. The court reasoned that these factors
supported the conclusion that the Reform Act could only contemplate a nonmodifiable lump sum award as a division of property.98
The Cates court did uphold the conclusion in Doerflinger that maintenance ingross finds its origin in the Maintenance Authorization Statute.9"
In addition, the language of the parties' separation agreement expressly stated
that the award of maintenance was not a division of property but was
determined by consideration of all the relevant factors set forth in the
The court concluded that the
Maintenance Authorization Statute." °

91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Nelson I, 221 'S.W. 1066, 1067 (Mo. 1920)).
93. Id. (quoting Nelson 1H, 720 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)). See supra notes
24-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory requirements of an award of
maintenance under Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.335 (1986 & 1991 Supp.).
94. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 735.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. See also supra note 24-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statute.
100. Id. The factors to be considered in the amount of the award of maintenance are set
forth in Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.335.2 (1991 Supp.):
2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as
the court deems just, and after considering all relevant factors including:
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maintenance award under consideration was "statutory maintenance" and thus
subject to the termination provisions of the Maintenance Termination
Statute. 01'
After answering the statutory maintenance question affirmatively, the
court then addressed the second level of inquiry to examine whether the
monthly payments not yet accrued were "future" payments as contemplated by
the Maintenance Termination Statute."° Ms. Cates argued that the decisions
03
precluded termination of installment
in Doerflinger and Mika v. Mika"
payments from a lump sum award upon the recipient spouse's remarriage." 4
The court pointed out that Ms. Cates' reliance on Doerflingerwas misplaced
because that decision only held that an award of maintenance in gross was a
final adjudication of financial need, the amount of which was nonmodifiable;
the case did not address the specific issue of termination upon remarriage.' °
In addition, the court had already held that the underlying rationale of
Doerflinger was flawed in assuming that need continues for the life of the
award because it was in direct conflict with the Maintenance Termination
Statute's presumption that need terminates upon remarriage of the receiving
spouse."
The court then declared that the decision in Mika, expressly holding an
award of maintenance in gross survives remarriage, was erroneous because it
had assumed that alimony and maintenance were the same thing. 7 There
is only one kind of maintenance, the court reasoned, and it is based on need,
only lasting until the recipient spouse can achieve a sufficient level of
independence.'0 8 The court stated that it would require a prescience of mind
to determine exactly how far into the future the spouse's need would continue
in order to justify a nonmodifiable in gross award-a prescience that the
modification and termination provisions do not permit."° The court agreed

(1) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including... ;
(2) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party
seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) The duration of the marriage;
(5) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance;
(6) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(7) The conduct of a party seeking maintenance during the marriage.
Id. See also supra note 14 for the terms of the separation agreement and decree.
101. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 735. See supra text accompanying note 30 for a portion of the
text of Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.370 (1986 & 1991 Supp.).
102. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 735.
103. 728 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
104. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 735-36.
105. Id. at 736.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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with the conclusion in Nelson 11 that the trial court's decision to permit
monthly installment payments on an in gross award was a determination that

the spouse's need continued into the future requiring future maintenance

payments."0 Therefore, the court held that the payments not yet due under
the award at issue are "future payments" of statutoryr maintenance within the
meaning of the Maintenance Termination Statute." Since the Maintenance
Termination Statute was applicable to an award of future maintenance, the
remarriage of Ms. Cates was held to have terminated Mr. Cates' obligation to
pay the future installments of the decree of maintenance absent an agreement
to the contrary." 2
This decision moved the court into the third level of inquiry to examine
whether the statutory presumption of termination upon remarriage was
rebutted by the decree of dissolution, the separation agreement, or a separate
written agreement to the contrary."' The court found no language in the
decree or separation agreement which expressly extended Mr. Cates'

obligation to continue monthly payments after Ms. Cates' remarriage."' In

addition, the court did not find any ambiguity in the language of the decree
or separation agreement upon which they could resort to extrinsic evidence to
clarify the parties' intent." 5 The court then pointed out that there were no

separate written agreements between the Cates providing for this situation." 6

Despite the previous findings of the court, Ms. Cates persisted in arguing
that the Maintenance Termination Statute did not apply to the award at issue
because the parties had expressly agreed that the maintenance was contractual
and not decretal under the Maintenance Authorization Statute," 7 and thus
it was not subject to modification by the trial court."' The court held that

110. Id. (citing Nelson 11, 720 S.W.2d 947, 957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Seesupranote 14 forthe specific language of the decree and separation agreement.
115. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 736. The court noted that pursuant to a prior decision where the
parties had agreed that maintenance would continue for as long as the wife lived, that if the
language of the agreement created an ambiguity with respect to termination, "'the completeness
and integration of the agreement will not prevent resort to extrinsic evidence in order to
determine the parties' true intent.'" Id. at 736-37 (quoting LaBarge v. Berndsen, 681 S.W.2d
441, 445 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)).
116. Id. at 737.
117. The statute reads in pertinent part that "the decree may expressly preclude or limit
modification of terms set forth in the decree if the separation agreement so provides." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.325.6 (1986).
118. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 737. The distinction between decretal and contractual
maintenance provisions lies within the methods of enforcement and modification. If an award
is decretal, it has been incorporated into the decree and is enforceable by all remedies available
to enforcement of other judgments and modifiable by the court. If an award is contractual, it
is not incorporated into the decree and is only enforceable in a separate action for breach of
contract. In addition, it can only be modified upon agreement of the parties, Where the award
is incorporated into the decree, but the parties stipulate that it is a contractual award, the courts
will read it as decretal for purposes of enforcement and contractual for purposes of modification.
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although the award was nonmodifiable due to the distinction, it was otherwise
irrelevant as to whether the Maintenance Termination Statute applied, since the
parties had not expressly provided for nontermination upon death or
remarriage to rebut the statutory presumption." 9 The court stated, "Both
contractual and decretal maintenance are statutory as they derive their origin
in Section 452.335 [the Maintenance Authorization Statute]." 2 ' The court
noted that the Maintenance Termination Statute treats modification and
termination differently-modification adjusts a continuing obligation by
judicial determination; termination ends an obligation by occurrence of a
specified event-the result being that the court could not "turn termination
into modification to support [Ms. Cates'] position." 121
The court hesitated to absolutely deny Ms. Cates' claim because of its
previous decision in Doerflinger. It vacated the judgment and remanded
the case to determine if the parties relied on precedent and assumed that

because it was "in gross" it would not be terminated by remarriage, thereby
1

eliminating the need for any specific language in the decree on this issue. 2
The court admonished drafters of decrees and separation agreements to supply
unambiguous language regarding any continuing obligations to pay mainteThe court
nance beyond the statutory presumptions of termination.2
expressly held that decisions in conflict with this holding should no longer be
followed."z The court also held that:
[f]or the future, where parties have assumed that maintenance in gross
provides a method for the distribution of property of a marriage over time,
and have so stated without ambiguity, such agreements must be upheld.
But where agreements either clearly indicate that a maintenance "in gross"
award is founded on the economic need of a spouse, or are ambiguous,
courts will determine the continued obligation of the paying party to pay
maintenance following remarriage or death upon the
126 language (or silence)
of the separation agreement or the court's decree.
The court required that in the future, specific language extending a spouse's
obligation to pay maintenance beyond death or remarriage must be included
in the decree or separation agreement in order to rebut the statutory presumption set forth in the Maintenance Termination Statute.
After the Cates decision, courts must recognize that in gross maintenance
awards payable in installments are terminated upon the remarriage of the
recipient spouse, or the death of either party. The only authorization

Id.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 13
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 58

remaining for ignoring this statutory presumption is either an express
agreement by the parties, or a designation that the award is actually a part of
the property settlement. The Cates court has removed the assumptions
underlying the use of "maintenance in gross" as a term of art.
V. COMMENT
It is doubtful whether the Missouri Legislature contemplated the
confusion that would be created by the failure to repeal section 452.080, the
Alimony Authorization Statute, upon enactment of the progressive and much
needed "no-fault" dissolution of marriage laws. The Nelson 11 court referred
to this failure as "inexplicable" in light of the change of principles underlying
continuing payments to a former spouse.'
The Cates court explained the
continued existence of the inconsistency was due to the need for an enforce129
ment mechanism for alimony awards granted prior to the Reform Act.
Whatever the reason, the instant decision has completely abrogated use of this
section as authorization for an award of "alimony in gross" under the current
dissolution of marriage laws.' The Missouri Supreme Court reconciled the
obvious inconsistency of the statutes by restricting future application of the
Alimony Authorization Statute to enforcement of awards of alimony decreed
before 1973 that may still exist.'
The Cates decision also precludes Missouri courts from interpreting the
Maintenance Authorization Statute as allowing an award of maintenance in
gross as a means of providing "support" to a dependent spouse.'3 2 The only
use for a lump sum payment that the court would countenance is to aid in the
division of marital property and never as a form of maintenance based on

need, regardless of how the parties designate it.'

Problems will arise

because courts and practitioners commonly have used the term "maintenance
in gross" loosely in the past, assuming the term itself would supply the intent
of the parties if the issue of termination should arise. When a court has
granted such an award, whether or not it will be terminated at death or
remarriage will be determined differently dependent only on the express
intention of the parties. Cates directed trial and appellate courts to:

1. Uphold agreements that clearly express an intention to use the award of
"maintenance in gross" to distribute the marital property regardless of the

confusion created by the terms used; and
2. If the parties intended an award of "maintenance in gross" to work as
a form of maintenance or the intent is unclear, then the court must look to

128. Nelson I, 720 SW.2d 947, 955 n.7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
129. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 735.
130. Id. at 738.
131. It is possible that some of these awards still remain in force in the 20 years that have
passed since the change in Missouri divorce laws.
132. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 738.
133. Id. at 735.
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the express language in the decree or written agreements for a statement
134
granting authority to extend the obligation beyond death or remarriage.
The Cates court allowed the instant case to be remanded to determine if
the parties relied on its decision in Doerflingerto prevent termination of the
award.' 3' Generally, when a judicial decision changes the previous
interpretation of a statute, the new interpretation will only be applied
prospectively if the parties can show reliance on the law as it previously
stood. 36 While this may prevent unfairness in application, the losing party
still has the burden of showing reliance on the previous construction. It seems
logical to conclude that this burden may be difficult to satisfy when a term
such as "maintenance in gross" is used as loosely as it has been. The court
clearly stated that future cases involving interpretation of an in gross award
must be decided according37 to the mandate outlined in their decision absent a
showing of this reliance.
A problem stemming from this decision that will cause legitimate concern
is the result in cases where a spouse has been given an award of maintenance
in gross to compensate for his or her support of the former spouse through
graduate or professional school. It is well settled in Missouri that advanced
degrees are not considered "property" and thus are not subject to "division" in
a dissolution proceeding.'
Rapp v. Rapp' also held that future earning
capacity resulting from advanced degrees is not marital property. 4 No
particular theory for compensating a spouse for supporting his or her former
spouse through professional school has been advanced. In Scott v. Scott, 4 '
the court refused to "pigeonhole" support for education into any theory of
compensation or recovery, but instead left the trial court to strike an
appropriate balance by giving the court the "flexibility to fashion their decrees
to meet the variety of circumstances presented by the cases."'42 The Scott

court specifically held that in this instance, a lump sum maintenance award
was an appropriate means for compensating the wife's contribution.'43
Although a lump sum in gross award does not itself create problems
concerning termination, problems do arise when the courts allow that lump
sum award to be paid in installments.'" The spouse who sacrificed to put

134. Id.

135. Id. at 738.
136. Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo. 1985) (en bane).
137. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 738.
138. See, e.g., Riaz v. Riaz, 789 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Roark v.

Roark, 694 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of Dusing, 654 S.W.2d 938,
946 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
139. 789 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
140. Id. at 149 (citing Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 435 (Mo. 1987) (en bane)
(future earning capacity from husband's business investment is not marital property)).
141. 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
142. Id. at 197.
143. Id. at 197-98.
144. This will have logically occurred frequently when a divorce is granted not long after
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his or her former spouse through school may be compensated for that sacrifice
through such an award, and because of the holding in Cates, may lose the
compensation prematurely. Since educational degrees are not regarded as
property, even if the in gross award states it is compensation for support for
the acquisition of an education, termination will not be precluded because it

is not deemed a property division. Thus, although the spouse has already

committed the time, sacrifice, and expense to put the former spouse through
school, the compensation for this will be cut short if either of them die or the
recipient decides to remarry, unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise.
What is due and owing to the sacrificing spouse will be lost in this nebulous
area of "not property division, not maintenance." While practitioners can
avoid this dilemma in the future through careful drafting with express
statements that the award does not terminate upon remarriage or death, such
future caution does not help the many divorced people who have been given
this award.
Another potentially problematic issue concerns the Internal Revenue
Code. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss tax ramifications in detail, it is interesting to note that despite what the parties call an
award, if they provide that it does not terminate upon remarriage or death,
then the payor spouse will not be able to deduct the payment from income and
the payee spouse will not be allowed to include it as income.145
A different problem may arise if the payor spouse declares bankruptcy.
The court may determine that the nontermination language deems the
payments to be part of the property settlement; therefore, the payments will
be debt that will be discharged in bankruptcy.'4 6 These are only a few of
the problems of interpretation encountered in areas outside of dissolution
proceedings. 4 7
Another ramification of this decision relates to judicial misperception that
a determination of maintenance in gross is necessary to "balance the
distribution of marital property in view of the valuations found by the trial
court.' 41 The court in Schatz found that prior decisions suggested, without
holding directly, "that an award of maintenance in gross may be used as a sort
of 'equalizer' to balance the equities between the parties in dividing the
marital and nonmarital property."' 49 Courts have tended not to include
language of the nature of property division in a decree of maintenance in
the spouse has earned his or her professional degree; years of schooling have probably depleted
the assets of the family and the graduate has not had an opportunity to build them back yet.

145. See I.R.C. § 71 (1988).
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (1988).
147. As stated in the text, an extensive discussion of these are matters well beyond the scope
of this Note, but are nonetheless interesting to note. Before drafting a separation agreement,
practitioners are well advised to investigate these matters further.
148. In re Marriage of Schatz, 768 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); see also Scott
v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
149. Schatz, 768 S.W.2d at 613. The court pointed to decisions in Doerflinger v.
Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); Warren v. Warren, 601 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). See also Moody v.
Moody, 725 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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gross. This would again cut off the recipient spouse's right to the award

solely because of the label attached. The payor spouse would, in effect, get
a windfall. Perhaps, in light of the previous case law holding that awards of
maintenance in gross cannot be terminated, the parties will be allowed to
demonstrate reliance on the meaning of this term of art as an implied intention
of nontermination, as the Cates court did.
The advantage of the Cates decision is the certainty with which courts
can now approach awards of maintenance in gross. The court and statutes
provide a clear method to continue payment of a maintenance obligation
The parties may provide through express
beyond death or remarriage.'
language in a decree or a separate written agreement that the obligation varies
from the statutory presumptions. Otherwise, the court may terminate or
modify the award as provided by statute.
VI. CONCLUSION

It will be interesting to observe how strictly trial courts apply the decision
in Cates. It may be that Missouri courts will try to get around terminating
awards when they feel it would be inequitable to do so by finding an
ambiguity in the language of the decree, separation agreement, or separate
written agreement of the parties, thus allowing extrinsic evidence to be
The courts may find property
introduced to discern their "true intent."'
division elements in lump sum awards payable over time where none were
apparent before, or allow the parties to prove this. If these are the interpretive
choices made by future courts, then Cates will be of less significance and
applied only in limited situations. Finally, in light of the unambiguous
mandate in the Cates opinion, courts may strictly apply the holding and
require that only express or clearly implied terms will negate the circumstances for termination of an award of maintenance in gross.
Undoubtedly, attorneys will get the message to expressly include the
intent of the parties if it in any way deviates from the statutory presumptions
set forth in the Maintenance Termination Statute.' 52 Careful drafting will
likely be the rule, not the exception. The Missouri Supreme Court has

150. Cates, 819 S.W.2d at 736; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.370.2 (1986 & 1991 Supp.).
151. As expressed supra text accompanying notes 122-23, the Cates court remanded the
decision to determine if the parties had detrimentally relied on precedent. Cates, 819 S.W.2d
at 738. Presumably, this means the parties will be entitled to present evidence on what they
thought the term of art "maintenance in gross" meant when it was applied to termination.
Where the ambiguity of the parties' intent is created by reliance on this Court's prior
(but now overruled in part) decisions, we deem it wise to remand the case to permit
the trial court to determine whether the parties intended the maintenance obligation
to meet Rochelle's economic needs for period of readjustment or to serve some
purpose outside Section 452.335 [the Maintenance Authorization Statute].

Id.
152. The Cates court's admonishment was that "[g]iven the unambiguous language of
Section 452.370.2 [the Maintenance Termination Statute] it is difficult to imagine the careful
drafter would fail to state the intent of the parties when failure to do so results in termination of
maintenance." Id.
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declared that a term of art used by attorneys and courts no longer has any
meaning in future awards of maintenance.
BECKY OWENSON KILPATRICK
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